Being "Short" Is Not A "Predisposing Genetic Characteristic" Under NY Law

A judge in New York City has just held that an employee who alleged that she was fired for being short did not state a claim under New York state law which protects against genetic discrimination in employment and therefore prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of a

“predisposing genetic characteristic.”


The Plaintiff was employed by the city Parks Department with duties which included cleaning the bathrooms and taking out the garbage. She claims that she was the shortest of five employees in her unit, and that a supervisor told her “that she could not do the job, that she was too short and that there was something medically wrong with her, and that he required her to visit a physician, verbally abused and harassed her” and ultimately fired her.


She sued under both the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law §290 et seq.), and the New York City Human Rights Law (New York City Administrative Code §8-101 et seq.), claiming that the predisposing genetic characteristic which allegedly constituted the illegal discrimination under these laws was her height. (Note: The city law contains no prohibition relating to “predisposing genetic characteristic.”)


The judge did not state how tall she was (and noted that neither did her complaint), although he noted that her lawyer put before him an article on dwarfism, which the judge deemed as not being established as authoritative, beside being irrelevant.

 

However, the judge dismissed her complaint.  He held that “the definitions section of the [state] Human Rights Law specifically defines ‘predisposing genetic characteristic’ as a genetic, or inherited, proclivity to developing, or risk of developing, a disease or disability. It has nothing to do with a person's physical height. … Therefore, not only is mere height precluded as a ‘predisposing genetic characteristic’ under a plain reading of the phrase, but the Legislature has defined the phrase as meaning only a genetic predisposition to developing a disease or disability.” 
 

 

He went on to state that: “The height of plaintiff is undisputably outside the scope of the plain meaning of the phrase ‘predisposing genetic characteristics’ as a prohibited basis for discrimination in the workplace. Clearly, a fully mature adult such as plaintiff who has attained her maximum growth cannot be ‘predisposed’, genetically or otherwise, to becoming that height. There is no issue in this case of predisposition to anything, whether medical or generally anthropomorphic.”


We must ask why Plaintiff chose one of the more obscure sections of the law to make her claim, and even then failed to plead what her height was, when she might have also made a claim for discrimination on the basis of “perceived disability.” We discussed in yesterday’s blog that under the federal ADA, as an EEOC attorney noted, “Employers must remember that they cannot deny work opportunities to people who are ready and able simply because of inaccurate perceptions about medical impairments and disabilities.”

 

It would appear that our Plaintiff might have been able to plead that since her supervisor told her that “she was too short and that there was something medically wrong with her, and that he required her to visit a physician,” she might have had a claim that he perceived her as disabled – although being “short” is not itself a disability.

 

The ADEA Landscape: Will Gross Be Legislatively Overturned?

Since the Supreme Court’s Gross decision, a federal ADEA plaintiff has a higher burden to prove discrimination - she must establish that “but-for” unlawful discrimination, the employer would not have taken the adverse action, such as firing her. The former “mixed motive” analysis used in ADEA discrimination claims became unavailable to ADEA plaintiffs under Gross.  On June 16, 2010, we wrote a long piece describing how Gross changed the existing law, and noted that lawmakers were trying to pass a law overturning Gross.  It never happened.

Under New York State law, although it has not been determined whether the more-liberal “mixed motive” analysis also applies to discrimination claims pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law, it has been held that the “but-for” standard does not apply to claims of discrimination brought under the broad New York City Human Rights Law (“CHRL”). 

 

Under the CHRL, a plaintiff seeking to prove age discrimination “need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a ‘motivating factor’” in the employer’s decision. Weiss v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2010 WL 114248 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2010).  Relying upon the New York City Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005 (Local Law No. 85)  Weiss explicitly rejected the "but-for" causation standard of Gross, and affirmatively adopted the continued interpretation of the CHRL’s “because of” language as requiring a plaintiff to prove only that age was a motivating factor. 

 

Senators -- from both parties -- are once again introducing a bill to overturn Gross.  Senate Bill 2189, known as the “Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act,” would re-establish the “mixed motive” analysis for ADEA claims.

 

We will, as we said two years ago, keep you posted.

 

Under New York City Human Rights Law, An Independent Contractor Can Be an Employee

One of the hot topics of employment law in the past few years has been the concept of independent contractors and the liability associated with improperly designating an employee as an independent contractor. However, I have not seen much written with respect to how independent contractors are handled under one of the more employee friendly statutes in the country—the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) (pdf). That is, how does this liberal statute deal with independent contractors and claims of employment discrimination?

 

Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) (pdf) look to the common law of agency to determine whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor. If the individual is an independent contractor then generally the employer is not liable for claims brought by that individual under Title VII and the NYSHRL.

 

However, under the NYCHRL, independent contractors may be counted as employees and can file employment discrimination claims against the contracting company, if they are “[n]atural persons employed as independent contractors to carry out work in furtherance of an employer’s business enterprise who are not themselves employers. . .” NYCHRL § 8-102 (5).

 

Thus, New York City employers that hire an individual who may be deemed an independent contractor under the common law of agency, may still be liable for that contractor’s claims of employment discrimination under the NYCHRL. Therefore, before you hire an “independent contractor” in New York City, consult your attorney and consider hiring contractors who are acting through a corporation.

 

Have a great weekend.